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The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Should It be Applied in OSHA Proceedings?
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court developed the exclusionary
rule to enforce the fourth amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.' The exclusionary rule is an eviden-
tiary doctrine which prohibits the admission of evidence in judicial
proceedings against a defendant if such evidence was obtained as a
result of an unconstitutional search of the defendant. Recently, the
rule has been the subject of frequent attacks from both commenta-
tors and members of the judiciary who want the rule either modi-
fied or completely abolished.
The applicability of the exclusionary rule to Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) proceedings is an unsettled area of the
law. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that the
fourth amendment is applicable to OSHA cases,2 it has never ap-
plied the exclusionary rule in such a setting. As a result, the lower
federal court decisions considering the question are in conflict.3
This comment will first analyze the development of the exclu-
sionary rule in both the criminal and administrative areas of the
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See infra notes 4-42 and accompany-
ing text.
Many commentators have recounted the history and evolution of the exclusionary rule.
See, e.g., Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a
Liberal Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DE PAUL L. Rev. 51, 52-75 (1980);
Jensen & Hart, The Good Faith Restatement of the Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 916, 917-21 (1982); Leonard, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: A Reasonable Approach for Criminal Justice, 4 WHrrrR L. REv. 33, 36-54 (1982);
Note, Confusion Regarding Exclusion: The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment, 23 AmIz.
L. REv. 801, 802-10 (1981); Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limita-
tions and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRim L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 877-83 (1982); Schlesinger
& Wilson, Property, Privacy and Deterrence: The Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Ration-
ale, 18 Duq. L. Rev. 225, 228-38 (1980); Trant, OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule: Should
the Employer Go Free Because the Compliance Officer has Blundered?, 1981 DuKE L.J.
667, 674-87 (1981); Wilson, The Origin and Development of the Federal Rule of Exclusion,
18 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 1073, 1073-1108 (1982). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
482-87 (1976).
2. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).
3. See Note, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Adjudica-
tory Proceedings, 66 IOWA L. Rlv. 343, 343-44 (1981).
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law. It will then review the criticisms currently being levied against
the rule as well as examining the alternative having the most sup-
port-the use of a good faith, reasonable belief exception to the
exclusionary rule. The comment concludes that, at least in OSHA
proceedings, the good faith, reasonable belief exception should be
employed.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
4
The language of the amendment does not dictate how it is to be
enforced nor does it provide any sanction for its violation. As a
result, at common law and during the early development of Ameri-
can constitutional law, evidence obtained by investigative methods
which violated the fourth amendment was freely admissible in tri-
als against the victims of the unlawful searches and seizures.8 An
early United States Supreme Court decision to that effect was
Adams v. New York," which held that collateral issues regarding
the legality of how evidence, otherwise admissible, was obtained,
could not be raised in a criminal trial.
The exclusionary rule appeared first in Boyd v. United States.8
In that case, Boyd was forced by the trial court to produce his per-
sonal records which incriminated him by indicating that he was
guilty of smuggling. The United States Supreme Court combined
the fourth amendment's illegal search and seizure provision and
the fifth amendment's protection against involuntary self-incrimi-
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment was ratified in response to the unwar-
ranted intrusions of British troops into the homes and business establishments of the Amer-
ican colonists. See Trant, supra note 1, at 669 n.14; Note, supra note 3, at 345. See also
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976).
5. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 165, at 365 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). The com-
mon law view was that "the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the
means through which the party has been enabled to obtain the evidence." 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2183, at 7 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See also Wilson, supra note 1, at
1074-76; Trant, supra note, 1 at 674; Note, supra note 3, at 344.
6. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
7. Id. at 595-97.
8. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
9. Id. at 617-18.
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nation, holding that the personal records were inadmissible.10 The
Court reasoned that there is no difference between the seizure of a
defendant's private records and forcing a defendant to testify
against himself." The Court went on to find that requiring Boyd to
produce his personal records amounted to an unreasonable search
as well as an involuntary self-incrimination, and concluded that
the personal records were not admissible at trial.'
The case generally credited with originating the exclusionary
rule is Weeks v. United States." That case involved the right of
the government to retain personal property seized in violation of
the fourth amendment for the purpose of admitting it into evi-
dence. 4 The Weeks Court found that the defendant's fourth
amendment right was denied when he requested that the govern-
ment return the illegally seized property and the government
failed to do so.' 5 As a remedy for this constitutional violation, the
Court held that the government could not use the unlawfully re-
tained evidence against the defendant in a criminal trial.16
The Weeks decision changed the prior law concerning the return
of illegally seized personal property1 7 by providing that such prop-
erty must be returned to its owner and is not admissible at trial' 8
The Court felt that some restrictions on the use of illegally seized
evidence were necessary to keep the guarantees of the fourth
amendment from becoming nullities.19 Also involved in the deci-
10. Id. at 634-35.
11. Id. at 633.
12. Id. at 633-35. It should be noted that the Boyd holding dealt only with the seizure
of items which the owner had the right to possess. The Boyd Court stated that the remedy
for the illegal seizure of goods that the defendant had no right to possess is an action for
damages in trespass, not the exclusion of the evidence at trial. Id. at 627-29. In the subse-
quent case of Adams, the Court held that evidence found in execution of a search warrant is
admissible, even if such evidence is the defendant's personal property. 192 U.S. at 597.
13. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. Id. at 393.
15. Id. at 398.
16. Id.
17. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 1087-90. The weight of precedent prior to Weeks was
that the defendant's right to possession of his property was postponed until the needs of
justice were satisfied. Id. at 1089-90. According to the then existing law, the defendant in
Weeks had only a civil remedy against the wrongdoer, which would have no effect on the
criminal process. Id. See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595-97 (1904). See also supra
note 5 and accompanying text.
18. It should be noted that the violation of the fourth amendment in Weeks was the
failure to return illegally seized property which the defendant had the right to possess. The
Weeks Court did not hold that illegally seized contraband could not be admitted against a
defendant in a criminal trial. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 1084-90.
19. 232 U.S. at 393. The Weeks Court stated the the failure to exclude evidence seized
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sion was the feeling that the judicial system should not sustain
convictions based upon evidence obtained through illegal searches
and seizures, as this amounted to condoning the unconstitutional
behavior. 20 Subsequent to Weeks, the federal courts used the
Weeks rationale to exclude from evidence all property obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment, including goods which the de-
fendant had no right to possess.
In Wolf v. Colorado,22 the United States Supreme Court held
that the provisions of the fourth amendment applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, but that the exclusionary rule
is not applicable to state court proceedings since it is not required
by the fourth amendment.2 This holding that the exclusionary
rule was not of constitutional origin, a reversal of the position
taken in Weeks, was justified on the grounds that each state
should consider the opinions of its citizens in enforcing the fourth
amendment right.2 4 The Wolf decision was later reversed in Mapp
v. Ohio,2 5 which required that the state courts apply the exclusion-
ary rule in criminal cases. 2 The Mapp Court returned to the posi-
tion adopted in Weeks and declared that the exclusionary rule was
required by the fourth amendment to protect the defendant's con-
stitutional right of privacy.2 7 Further justification for the required
use of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases was provided by the
arguments involving judicial integrity28 and deterrence of future
fourth amendment violations.29
Since the Mapp case, the United States Supreme Court has
abandoned the position that the exclusionary rule is required by
the fourth amendment, and has given only cursory treatment to
in violation of the fourth amendment is a denial of the defendant's constitutional rights. Id.
at 398.
20. Id. at 394.
21. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 1090. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 497-98
(1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See generally Trant, supra note 1.
22. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
23. Id. at 28-33.
24. Id. at 28-30.
25. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
26. Id. at 655. The Court noted that the other remedies for violations of the fourth
amendment were worthless and futile. Id. at 651-52.
27. Id. at 654-55. The Court stated that without the exclusionary rule, the fourth
amendment would be valueless, a mere "form of words." Id. at 655.
28. The Court felt that the integrity of the judicial system requires the exclusion of
tainted evidence. Id. at 659-60.
29. Id. at 655-56. One year before the Mapp case, the United States Supreme Court
had first used the deterrence of future constitutional violations as a justification for the
exclusionary rule. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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judicial integrity as a justification for the rule."0 The remaining
justification for the continued use of the exclusionary rule is the
belief that it acts to deter future violations of the fourth amend-
ment by investigating officials. 31 Linkletter v. Walker32 was the
first case after Mapp to hold that deterrence of future unlawful
conduct is the primary justification for the exclusionary rule.
33
Since then, the Court has consistently held that the primary pur-
pose, if not the sole purpose, of the exclusionary rule is the deter-
rence of future constitutional violations by investigating officials."
Besides limiting the purposes behind the exclusionary rule,
the most recent United States Supreme Court cases have limited
the situations to which the rule applies. In United States v.
Calandra,3 5 the Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to
grand jury proceedings. 6 The Calandra Court reasoned that there
would be very little incremental deterrent effect produced by ap-
plying the rule in those proceedings.-7 Similarly, the Court has re-
fused to extend the exclusionary rule to cases involving retroactive
application of a statute limited or overruled by a United States
Supreme Court decision, s8 federal civil cases involving evidence un-
30. See generally Schlesinger & Wilson, supra note 1; Recent Development, Limiting
the Application of the Exclusionary Rule: The Good Faith Exception, 34 VAND. L. REv. 213
(1981). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974).
31. See Trant, supra note 1, at 679-87; Wilson, supra note 1, at 1105-07. See generally
Note, supra note 1; Schlesinger & Wilson, supra note 1.
32. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
33. Id. at 636-37.
34. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974).
Many commentators have criticized the inconsistent manner in which the Court has ap-
plied the exclusionary rule over the years, noting the shifts in the foundation and the ration-
ale given for its application or non-application. One writer has reasoned that the Court faces
the dilemma of either modifying the rule and overturning years of constitutional precedent
or excluding reliable evidence from the trier of fact. This has caused a series of compromises
to restrict the type of case to which the rule applies and to redefine the rights that the rule
protects. Bernardi, supra note 1, at 74-75. See generally Schlesinger & Wilson, supra note 1;
Recent Development, supra note 30.
35. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
36. Id. at 350-51.
37. Id. at 351.
38. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). In Peltier, the Court held that when
officials act in accordance with a federal statute in obtaining evidence used to convict a
defendant, the exclusionary rule will not be retroactively applied if the statute is later lim-
ited or overruled by a Supreme Court decision. Id. at 541-42.
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lawfully obtained by state officials, 39 and federal habeas corpus
cases,40 because there would be little, if any, additional deterrent
effect of such application. The culmination of these cases was the
approach announced in Stone v. Powell,41 that a court must bal-
ance the additional deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary
rule in a particular instance against the additional costs to society
in excluding relevant, probative evidence of the defendant's guilt.
42
III. DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
A. General Case Law
Although the United States Supreme Court had, at an early
date, ruled that business locations are protected by the fourth
amendment in criminal searches, 48 it originally found that admin-
istrative agency investigations of businesses were exempt from the
prohibition of warrantless searches.44 In Frank v. Maryland,45 the
Court focused on the issue of whether administrative searches con-
ducted without a search warrant are unreasonable, and found that
the interests of society which are protected by the administrative
agency are more important than the privacy right protected by the
fourth amendment.46 Thus, an administrative search could be le-
gally conducted even if it violated the Constitution.47 This position
was later overruled by the companion cases of Camara v. Munici-
pal Court45 and See v. City of Seattle,49 which held that fourth
39. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). In Janis, the Internal Revenue Service
was allowed to admit evidence in a federal civil tax proceeding even though that evidence
was obtained by state officials pursuant to a search warrant found to be defective. Id. at 454.
40. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Stone, the Court refused federal review of
a state court conviction where the defendant claimed that the prosecution relied on unlaw-
fully obtained evidence. Id. at 494-95.
41. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
42. Id. at 488-94. The contemporary test for whether the exclusionary rule is justified
in a particular case involves balancing the utility of the rule against the costs inflicted by
the rule on social policy. Wilson, supra note 1, at 1108.
43. Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
44. See Note, supra note 3, at 356; Casenote, Administrative Inspections and OSHA:
Abridging Fourth Amendment Safeguards? - Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 15 GA. L. Rv.
233, 233 (1980).
45. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
46. Id. at 365-67. The Court used a balancing test which considered the purpose of the
search, the time and manner in which it was conducted, and the grounds used by the agency
in deciding to make it. Id.
47. Id. The Court stated that administrative agency searches "touch at most upon the
periphery" of the interests protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom from offi-
cial intrusion. Id. at 367.
48. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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amendment protection extends to administrative agency searches
of business property.5 0 Although a few specific exceptions to this
view were created in Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States5 1
and United States v. Biswell,5 2 the United States Supreme Court
continues to adhere to the position advanced in the Camara and
See cases, as evidenced by their express affirmation in Air Pollu-
tion Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.53
The Camara and See cases settled the law as to the applicability
of the fourth amendment to administrative agency investigations.
However, neither case mentioned the applicability of the exclu-
sionary rule to administrative agency searches and seizures. 4 In
fact, the United States Supreme Court has never applied the ex-
clusionary rule in an administrative proceeding,55 which leaves un-
answered the question of whether the exclusionary rule pertains to
administrative cases.5 6
B. OSHA Case Law
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) 57 during the time when some exceptions to the Camara-
See rationale were being created.58 These exceptions, 9 plus the
49. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
50. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. However, the Court ruled that the standard of probable
cause required for the issuance of an administrative search warrant may be less stringent
than the criminal probable cause standard. Id. at 534-39.
51. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). The Court held that no search warrant is required when the
business investigated is in an industry which has a long history of government regulation.
Id. at 76-77.
52. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). The Court ruled that no search warrant is necessary when the
business conducted is of a nature which requires governmental regulation. Id. at 315-17. In
this particular case, the firearms industry was involved and a federal statute authorized
warrantless searches. Id. at 311-12.
53. 416 U.S. 861, 864 (1974). The Court has also noted its continuing agreement with
the Camara-See position in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978).
54. See Note, supra note 3, at 358.
55. Id. at 387. See also Shanks, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule and
its Alternatives, 57 TuL. L. REv. 648, 648 (1983).
56. See Note, supra note 3, at 343-44, 355-63. Under the current standard announced
in Stone v. Powell, the courts must weigh the additional deterrence of future fourth amend-
ment violations against the social costs of excluding the evidence. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
58. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
59. Id. The exceptions are based upon the need for regulation for the benefit of society
and upon statutes and their related rules allowing warrantless searches. See United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 325-26 (1972); Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72,
77 (1970).
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fact that the statute does not require that an OSHA inspector ob-
tain a warrant before engaging in a search, 0 led courts to presume
the fourth amendment was inapplicable to OSHA inspections.6'
The United States Supreme Court reversed this view in Marshall
v. Barlow's Inc., 2 where the protections of the fourth amendment
were held to be applicable to OSHA inspections.6 3
In Barlow's, the United States Supreme Court found that the
warrant clause of the fourth amendment protects commercial
buildings as well as private homes and can be applied to both civil
and criminal investigations.64 The Court went on to state that war-
rantless searches are generally unreasonable, citing Camara and
See. 65 However, only the fourth amendment provisions were found
to be applicable to OSHA inspections, and no mention of the ex-
clusionary rule was made.6 Accordingly, the law is not settled as to
whether the exclusionary rule applies to unlawful OSHA searches
and seizures.6
In the wake of Barlow's, the federal courts have had to struggle
with the question of whether the exclusionary rule applies to
OSHA proceedings. In the first two such cases, Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. Secretary of Labor" and Savina Home Industries, Inc. v.
Secretary of Labor,69 two circuit courts came to opposite conclu-
sions7 In Todd, the Ninth Circuit noted that since the United
States Supreme Court had never applied the exclusionary rule to
either a civil case or an OSHA investigation, the circuit courts
60. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 309 (1978);
Casenote, supra note 44, at 234.
61. See Trant, supra note 1, at 687.
62. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
63. Id. at 311, 324-25. The Court ruled that an employer is "entitled to a declaratory
judgment that the [OSHA] is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspections
without warrant or its equivalent and to an injunction enjoining the Act's enforcement to
that extent." Id. at 325.
64. Id. at 311-13.
65. Id. at 312-13. The Court noted that the authority to make warrantless searches
"devolves almost unbridled discretion" to the official involved, and that requiring a warrant
provides assurances that a neutral party believes the search is reasonable. Id. at 323.
66. See Trant, supra note 1, at 687.
67. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
68. 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978).
69. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
70. Both cases were ultimately decided on retroactivity grounds-since the OSHA in-
spection took place before the Barlow's decision was handed down, there was no way for the




should not so apply the rule. Conversely, in Savina, the Tenth
Circuit stated in dicta that the exclusionary rule would be applica-
ble to OSHA proceedings in an appropriate case.7 2 After noting
that the Supreme Court had applied the exclusionary rule in civil
cases which could be characterized as "quasi-criminal," the Savina
court went on to state that the considerations of judicial integrity
and deterring official lawlessness are still of consequence when an
illegal search is conducted by the Department of Labor instead of
the Department of Justice.1
The decisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC) were also affected by the Barlow's case. The
OSHRC cases before Barlow's never applied the exclusionary rule
since it was presumed that the fourth amendment did not pertain
to OSHA.74 Since Barlow's, however, the OSHRC has consistently
held that, in searches by OSHA inspectors which violate the fourth
amendment right of an employer, the evidence obtained must be
excluded in any OSHA proceeding against such employer.
7 5
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusionary rule has had a variety of critics over the years,
including Congressmen, 76 the American Law Institute,7 a United
States Attorney General,78 and four Justices on the current United
States Supreme Court.7 As early as 1926, influential legal scholars
such as Judge Cardozo criticized the use of the rule.80 In addition,
71. 586 F.2d at 689.
72. 594 F.2d at 1363.
73. Id. at 1362-63.
74. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 1982 O.S.H.D. 1 25,912; Secretary of
Labor v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 9 O.S.H.C. (BNA) 1608 (1981); Secretary of Labor v. Genes-
see Valley Indus. Packaging, 8 O.S.H.C. (BNA) 1509 (1980).
76. Several bills were introduced during the 97th Congress to eliminate or modify the
exclusionary rule. Schlag, supra note 1, at 875.
77. This association proposed that motions to suppress evidence be granted only if the
constitutional violation was substantial after considering all of the circumstances. Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, § SS 290.2(2) (1975).
78. Attorney General William F. Smith's Task Force on Violent Crime advocated a
"reasonable good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, since the remedy for a violation
of a constitutional right should be proportional to the magnitude of the violation. Attorney
General's Task Force on Violent Crime, Final Report 55 (August 17, 1981).
79. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and White have all advocated
modification of the exclusionary rule. See infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
80. Judge Cardozo, sitting on the highest court in the State of New York, made his
famous criticism of the exclusionary rule: "(T]he criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered .. " People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926).
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the United States Supreme Court has recently refused to extend
the applicability of the rule to many types of cases.8" These critics
do not contend that the exclusionary rule is not beneficial, but
hold the opinion that its costs exceed its benefits in many
situations.
Criticisms of the exclusionary rule are varied. Probably the most
common complaint is that the use of the rule keeps reliable evi-
dence from the fact-finder. As a result, many wrong-doers go free
and both the law and the fact-finding process are distorted.82 The
critics of the rule, noting that it is a judicially created remedy and
that its imposition depends upon its related costs and benefits,
contend that this is too high a price to pay for the deterrent effect
of the rule."
Some critics even dispute that the exclusionary rule acts to deter
violations of the fourth amendment to any significant extent.
There has never been an empirical study which has shown that the
rule does in fact deter official unlawful acts.84 Additionally, even if
it is assumed that the exclusionary rule does deter some official
misconduct, its critics claim it has no effect on the majority of
search and seizure actions. For instance, it will not deter an offi-
cial's acts where the main purpose behind the search is other than
to obtain evidence for trial or to convict the object of the search.8
Further, logic dictates that there is no deterrence in cases where
the official conducted the search in the belief that he was not in
violation of the fourth amendment. 8 In both of these circum-
81. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 79-80; Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the
Exclusionary Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1065, 1085-87, 1091-94 (1982). See also Illinois v.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2342 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,
136 (1954).
83. See generally Bernardi, supra note 1; Goodpaster, supra note 82, Jensen & Hart,
supra note 1. See also Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2342 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
84. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 75; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 665, 667 (1970).
The United States Supreme Court has also noted that the deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule has never been established by empirical evidence despite numerous attempts.
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-53 (1976).
85. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 76; Shanks, supra note 55, at 654-57; Good-
paster, supra note 82, at 1083, 1084. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 417-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
86. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 76; Jensen & Hart, supra note 1, at 96.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that there is little if any deterrent effect
from the exclusionary rule in cases where the offending officer did not believe that his
search violated the Constitution. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39, 542
(1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). See infra notes 123-26 and accompa-
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stances, exclusion of the evidence at trial does not serve the pur-
pose of the rule, but enables guilty parties to evade justice.
Another common criticism of the exclusionary rule is that it is
not an effective remedy for a constitutional violation. Exclusion of
evidence at trial does not repair or redress the individual for the
violation of his right of privacy. 7 In addition, the rule is of benefit
only to guilty parties, because an illegal search of an innocent per-
son will uncover no evidence which would lead to his being brought
to trial. Since the exclusionary rule is the only sanction commonly
applied to a fourth amendment violation, the innocent victims of
illegal searches are left with a right without a remedy." A further
complaint about the remedial aspects of the rule is that its applica-
tion has the same effect regardless of the degree to which the offi-
cial's search violated the law or the type of crime of which the de-
fendant is accused. The critics contend that trivial or insignificant
violations of the fourth amendment should not be treated in the
same manner as blatant ones and that the disparity between the
minor infringement of the defendant's rights caused by the search
and the huge benefit provided by the application of the rule is con-
trary to the idea of proportionality engrained in the American con-
cept of justice.89
There are numerous other criticisms of the exclusionary rule.
Some critics contend that the use of the rule makes police overly
cautious in that they will not engage in reasonable and proper
searches for fear that the search would be found illegal by the
courts.90 Additionally, the rule causes public disrespect and an un-
favorable public opinion of the legal system when its application
permits guilty defendants to go free.91 Furthermore, the critics
contend that the existence of the rule has discouraged the develop-
ment of alternatives which might prove to be more effective in pro-
nying text.
87. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 78; Goodpaster, supra note 82, at 1084.
88. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 78; Goodpaster, supra note 82, at 1084;
Shanks, supra note 55, at 657.
89. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 106-07; Goodpaster, supra note 82, at 1085,
1087-88; Shanks, supra note 55, at 653-54. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490
(1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., Shanks, supra note 55, at 654-57. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
91. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 79; Goodpaster, supra note 82, at 1089-90;




tecting the fourth amendment right.9 2 All of these factors have
caused an increasing number of people to call for abandonment or
modification of the exclusionary rule.
V. THE GOOD FAITH, REASONABLE BELIEF ExCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Concerned parties have suggested a variety of methods of en-
forcing the fourth amendment as alternatives to the exclusionary
rule. One viewpoint is that sanctions should be imposed against
the individual official or government which conducted the illegal
search, such as requiring that criminal charges be brought or al-
lowing the victim to institute a civil action for damages.93 Another
suggestion is that the police and the regulatory agencies be re-
quired to have strong, effective internal disciplinary procedures for
fourth amendment violators.94 Other commentators believe that
the entire area should be governed by an administrative agency
with the power to implement its own regulations, punishments and
remedies in cases involving the fourth amendment right.9 5 How-
ever, the most popular alternative to the present state of the law is
the employment of a good faith, reasonable belief exception to the
exclusionary rule.
Numerous commentators have made persuasive arguments that
illegally obtained evidence should be admissible if the officer con-
ducted the search in good faith and with the reasonable belief that
92. See e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 80-81; Goodpaster, supra note 82, at 1094-95.
See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
93. This practice is followed in England, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, none of which exclude unlawfully obtained
evidence to any appreciable extent. See Shanks, supra note 55, at 659-70.
Defenders of the exclusionary rule believe that civil or criminal lawsuits would be ineffec-
tive in deterring fourth amendment violations. They point out that criminal sanctions al-
ready exist, but that the government employs them only in cases of serious abuse. They also
note that victims of illegal searches can presently bring civil actions, but that their chances
of recovery are slim since plaintiffs who themselves are guilty of violating the law arouse
very little sympathy in a jury. See, e.g., Trant, supra note 1, at 711-13. See generally
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and
"Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307 (1982).
94. This practice is used in both England and the Federal Republic of Germany. See
Shanks, supra note 55, at 662-63, 668.
Defenders of the exclusionary rule voice skepticism over whether internal disciplinary
proceedings would be an effective alternative remedy. See, e.g., Trant, supra note 1, at 714.
See generally LaFave, supra note 93.
95. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 82, at 1100-07; Hanscom, Admissibility of Ille-
gally Seized Evidence in Civil Cases: Could This be the Path Out of the Labyrinth of the
Exclusionary Rule?, 9 PEPPERniNE L. REV. 799, 817-18 (1982).
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the search was lawful.96 The main thrust of their argument is
based upon the recent position of the United States Supreme
Court that deterrence is the only rationale for the exclusionary
rule.97 Accordingly, there is no deterrence when the rule is invoked
to suppress evidence obtained by an official acting in good faith
and with a reasonable belief that the search did not violate the
fourth amendment. The logic involved is that the official's conduct
would have been the same regardless of the applicability of the ex-
clusionary rule, as he did not believe any constitutional violation
was taking place. 98
The good faith, reasonable belief exception to the exclusionary
rule has its share of critics, some who favor the continuation of the
present state of the law and others who propose a different alter-
native to the exclusionary rule. For instance, some commentators
note that enactment of the good faith, reasonable belief exception
will disregard both the personal constitutional right and judicial
integrity justifications for the exclusionary rule.9e Other commen-
tators have stated that since acquiring a search warrant would
comprise the good faith, reasonable belief conduct necessary to
create an exception to the exclusionary rule, investigating officials
would engage in "magistrate shopping" to obtain search warrants
in cases where the evidence is insufficient to constitute probable
cause.100 Neither of these arguments is very persuasive since the
established purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the uncon-
stitutional conduct of investigating officials, not to protect the in-
dividual's constitutional right of privacy and the court's integrity,
or to regulate the activities of magistrates and judges.10'
A more persuasive argument against the good faith, reasonable
belief exception to the exclusionary rule is that it could lead to the
96. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 101-07; Jensen & Hart, supra note 1, at 930-
36; Leonard, supra note 1, at 55-56.
97. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court
has stated the deterrence justification of the exclusionary rule in the following ways: "[The
rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct.... ." United States v. Ca-
landra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its pur-
pose is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty . . . by removing the
incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
98. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 101-02; Jensen & Hart, supra note 1, at 932-
33; Leonard, supra note 1, at 55-56. See also Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2343-44
(1983) (White, J., concurring).
99. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 93, at 340.
100. See, e.g., Trant, supra note 1, at 709; LaFave, supra note 93, at 353-54.
101. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. See also Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 2345 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
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situation where the ignorant, untrained investigating official will be
favored.10 2 The major premise of this argument is that if the offi-
cial is poorly informed about fourth amendment law, almost all of
his search and seizure conduct would be in good faith and with the
reasonable belief that no constitutional violation has occurred,
thus all evidence uncovered would be admissible. 03 Related to this
view is that, in cases where an unconstitutional search has taken
place but the evidence is admitted, the illegal conduct will not be
publicized, so future conduct of the same nature will still be within
the exception. In effect, admitting the evidence under the excep-
tion will be interpreted as a message that the investigative conduct
will be regarded as reasonable in the future.'0 ' The supporters of
the exception contend that this argument is without merit since
the courts can use an objective standard in determining whether a
search was in fact a reasonable one. Thus, the boundaries of rea-
sonable searches can be determined by the courts and not by the
level of knowledge of the investigating official. 0 5
A second strong argument against the good faith, reasonable be-
lief exception to the exclusionary rule involves the difficulty of de-
fining or recognizing both "good faith" conduct and "reasonable"
actions. 0 6 Bolstering this argument is the fact that there are no
hard and fast rules to determine when someone's conduct was per-
formed in good faith and was reasonable. As a result, it is feared
that fourth amendment law will become a series of inconsistent
cases, since each judge will have a different standard for evaluating
"good faith" conduct and "reasonable" beliefs.10 7 However, the
proponents of the exception to the rule note that the courts are
already required to evaluate the good faith and reasonableness
issues in many other areas of law, as well as stating that, in
many situations, "reasonableness" can be measured by objective
standards. 08
102. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 93, at 342-44; Recent Development, supra note 30,
at 228-29; Schlag, supra note 1, at 895-96; Note, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule, 57 NoTma DAME LAW. 112, 130-31, 134-35 (1981).
103. See supra note 102.
104. Id. One commentator has stated that a rule admitting evidence has the effect of
legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence. LaFave, supra note 93, at 358-59.
105. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 104-06; Jensen & Hart, supra note 1, at 934-
35. See also Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2346-47 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
106. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 93, at 341, 334; Recent Development, supra note 10,
at 229-30; Note, supra note 102, at 132.
107. See supra note 106.
108. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 104; Jensen & Hart, supra note 1, at 934. See
also Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2347 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
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A final persuasive argument against the adoption of a good faith,
reasonable belief exception to the exclusionary rule is the fear that
much of the deterrent effect of the rule will be lost. This argument
is grounded on the belief that the real beneficiary of the rule is
society in general, as the exclusion of evidence removes the incen-
tive to violate the fourth amendment so that the frequency of fu-
ture violations will decrease. Accordingly, if exceptions to the rule
are allowed, an incentive to violate constitutional rights could be
created and investigating officials might always choose the
broadest possible construction of the standards of conduct, result-
ing in an increase in the number of fourth amendment viola-
tions.10 9 The supporters of the exception to the exclusionary rule
regard this argument to be without merit. First, since there is no
empirical evidence that the exclusionary rule deters unlawful con-
duct,110 there is no authoritative evidence that providing an excep-
tion to the rule will detract from its deterrent effect. 1' Further-
more, the belief that investigating officers will invariably choose
the broadest construction of the law to allow themselves to violate
people's rights depicts such officials as law violators in practice-a
view that unfairly .deprecates both the intentions of the investigat-
ing officers as a whole and their actual performance in the execu-
tion of their duties. Without evidence upon which to base the
claim that intentional violations of the fourth amendment will nec-
essarily increase, this argument is merely unsupported
speculation."
2
Despite the strong criticism, support is growing for the adoption
of a good faith, reasonable belief exception to the exclusionary
rule. Recently, in United States v. Williams, ls the Fifth Circuit
approved the use of the exception in a criminal case. '14 The court
reasoned that the exclusionary rule is a judge-made rule designed
to enforce constitutional requirements and is justified only by its
109. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 93, at 346-47, 352-54; Goodpaster, supra note 82, at
1097.
110. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 1, at 105; Note, supra note 1, at 823. See also
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2343 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
112. See Bernardi, supra note 1, at 105. This commentator stated that the exclusion-
ary rule will not significantly deter intentional or bad faith violations of the fourth amend-
ment, as the violator can distort the facts at a suppression hearing to avoid exclusion of the
improperly gained evidence. He advocates criminal sanctions, civil tort remedies, and inter-
nal department investigations to try to deter intentional violations of search and seizure
law. Id.
113. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
114. Id. at 846-47.
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deterrence of future police misconduct. After noting that the bene-
fit of the rule must be balanced against its costs, the court held
that it should not be applied in contexts where it does not effec-
tively deter official misconduct, such as in cases where the investi-
gative actions were undertaken in good faith and were objectively
reasonable. 1"
Four Justices on the current Supreme Court have also voiced
support for the good faith, reasonable belief exception to the exclu-
sionary rule. Chief Justice Burger, an early critic of the exclusion-
ary rule,"1s advocated the exception to the rule in his concurring
opinion in Stone v. Powell.17 Justice Powell argued in favor of the
exception to the rule in Brown v. Illinois,"5 as did Justice Rehn-
quist in United States v. Peltier."9 The most outspoken member
of the Court in advocating a good faith, reasonable belief exception
to the exclusionary rule is Justice White. In his dissenting opinion
in Stone v. Powell,120 he expressed this belief by stating:
When law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good faith
and on reasonable grounds, and yet the evidence they have seized is later
excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent effect. The officers, if they do
their duty, will act in similar fashion in similar circumstances in the future;
and the only consequence of the rule as presently administered is that un-
impeachable and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the
truth-finding function of proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial to-
tally aborted.121
Justice White has recently made similar statements in his concur-
115. Id. at 841-42. The Fifth Circuit made the following statement:
Sitting en banc, we now hold that evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclu-
sionary rule where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken
in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are authorized.
We do so because the exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by
police, not reasonable, good-faith ones. Where the reason for the rule ceases, its appli-
cation must cease also. The costs to society of applying the rule beyond the purposes
it exists to serve are simply too high... with few or no offsetting benefits.
Id. at 840.
116. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
117. 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
118. 422 U.S. 590, 606 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell noted that the
exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the investigating official has engaged in willful, or
at least negligent, conduct. He reasoned that when this premise is lacking, the deterrence
rationale of the rule does not obtain, and there is no legitimate justification for depriving
the prosecution of the evidence. Id. at 612.
119. 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975).
120. 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 540.
700
Exclusionary Rule
ring opinion in Illinois v. Gates.122
Furthermore, the Court has, in its majority opinions, frequently
noted that the good faith and reasonableness of the conduct by the
investigating official should have an effect upon the application
of the exclusionary rule. In Michigan v. Tucker,12 the Court
declared:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the
police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which
has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence
gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those partic-
ular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of
care towards the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued
in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its
force."'
The Court's statement regarding the good faith and reasonableness
of the investigating officer's actions was more direct in United
States v. Peltier:12 5 "If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the officer
had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that
the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."'"6
Subsequently, the Court has alluded to the good faith and reasona-
bleness of the investigating officer's conduct as it pertains to the
application of the exclusionary rule in Brown v. Illinois127 and
United States v. Janis.
s2 8
VI. THE APPLICATION OF THE GOOD FAITH, REASONABLE BELIEF
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO OSHA SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
When considering the differing positions taken by the Justices of
the United States Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and the
legal commentators, it is not surprising that there is a conflict be-
tween the only two cases decided by the federal courts of appeals
regarding the use of a good faith, reasonable belief exception to the
exclusionary rule when an OSHA search violated the fourth
122. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2336 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
123. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
124. Id. at 447.
125. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
126. Id. at 542.
127. 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
128. 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976).
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amendment. Although the OSHRC has consistently applied the ex-
clusionary rule since the Barlow's decision," 9 the Seventh Circuit
and the Eleventh Circuit have reached opposite conclusions in
their reviews of the OSHRC decisions.
In Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 130 the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the OSHRC decision that a good faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule is not applicable to an illegal OSHA search.131 The
court noted that the primary function of the exclusionary rule is to
deter unlawful conduct and that the United States Supreme Court
continues to adhere to the position that some form of exclusion is
necessary to deter violations of the fourth amendment. 3 2 The
court went on to state that the ultimate issue of the case was not
the good faith of the investigating officer, but whether the officer
lawfully obtained the evidence. 133 In its holding, the court merely
agreed with the OSHRC that the cost of suppressing the evidence
"was outweighed by the need to ensure widespread OSHA agent
compliance with the fourth amendment."'
3
Conversely, in Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co.,'"
the Seventh Circuit reversed an OSHRC decision applying the ex-
clusionary rule and ruled that a good faith, reasonable belief ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule is appropriate under the proper
circumstances.3 6 The court noted that the exclusionary rule has no
deterrent effect when law enforcement personnel have acted mis-
takenly, but in good faith and on reasonable grounds. 137 After stat-
ing that suppression of relevant and incriminating evidence can
cause substantial societal harm, the court declared that the em-
ployment of the exclusionary rule can allow noncompliance with
129. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
130. 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
131. Id. at 1063.
132. Id. at 1070. The court stated that, if the exclusionary rule is the proper enforce-
ment tool to deter future unlawful conduct, its application in an OSHRC proceeding is not
improper. Id. at 1071.
133. Id. at 1072.
134. Id. The court declared that the OSHRC is in a good position to determine if the
exclusionary sanction is an appropriate mechanism in its own proceedings, subject to review
by the judicial courts. Since the Commission has a special expertise in the area of OSHA
practices and procedures, it is best able to evaluate the deterrent impact of the exclusionary
rule. Id.
135. 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982).
136. Id. at 1022-25.
137. Id. at 1023. The court twice noted that the OSHA compliance officer obtained a
search' warrant and conducted the search in good faith and with the reasonable belief that
the activities were lawful.Id. at 1021, 1025.
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OSHA.13 8 Accordingly, the court held that evidence gathered
through OSHA's reasonable and good faith inspection should not
be suppressed by the exclusionary rule, even if the fourth amend-
ment right was violated. 139
VII. CONCLUSION
Throughout its history, the exclusionary rule has never been
consistently applied pursuant to any one rationale. 40 The rule it-
self is of very recent origin, and has been applied in administrative
cases only within the past sixteen years.' Indeed, the wording of
the fourth amendment does not command exclusion, nor can it be
logically inferred that, after an investigating officer has committed
a trespass, the evidence so obtained shall be inadmissible in a trial
against the victim of the trespass.142 Add to this the valid criti-
cisms of the rule, and application of a good faith, reasonable belief
exception to the exclusionary rule in administrative cases becomes
more attractive.
The criticisms of the good faith, reasonable belief exception to
the exclusionary rule, though persuasive, are totally speculative. 4
Since the exception has been used in only one federal circuit,'4
and that very recently, there is no concrete evidence of its benefits
and detriments. Until the exception is applied, it will not be
known whether, as a whole, it is beneficial to society or not.
Cases brought under OSHA provide an ideal starting point for
the employment of a good faith, reasonable belief exception to the
exclusionary rule. First, there already exist substantial deterrents
to OSHA violations of the employer's constitutional rights. In ad-
dition to requiring an OSHA inspector to obtain a search warrant
from a neutral magistrate to inspect premises when an employer
objects, the employer may move to quash a warrant prior to its
execution or refuse entry pursuant to such warrant unless OSHA
138. Id. at 1024.
139. Id. at 1023. The court's rationale for the decision rested on the view that good
faith, reasonably based violations of the fourth amendment cannot be deterred by the exclu-
sionary rule. Id. at 1023-25.
140. See supra notes 13-34 and accompanying text. See generally Trant, supra note 1;
Wilson, supra note 1; Schlesinger & Wilson, supra note 1; Note, supra note 1; LaFave,
supra note 93; Recent Development, supra note 30; Schlag, supra note 1; Bernardi, supra
note 1.
141. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
142. Wilson, supra note 1, at 1073.
143. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
144. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
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has previously prevailed in a civil contempt proceeding.14 5
A second reason that the good faith, reasonable belief exception
to the exclusionary rule should be applicable to OSHA cases re-
lates to the purpose of the Act in protecting the health and safety
of the country's employees. 4 6 When the physical well-being of in-
nocent people is at stake, society's norms dictate that evidence of
safety violations should not be suppressed under any circum-
stances, much less when such evidence was obtained by an OSHA
inspector acting in good faith and with the reasonable belief that
the inspection was lawful. The important public policy of the
health and welfare of the country's citizens must take precedence
over the privacy rights of employers, especially when there is no
proof that applying the exception to the exclusionary rule will in-
crease the number of fourth amendment violations.
Finally, OSHA cases, by the nature of the penalties and defen-
dants involved, are ideal cases in which to apply the good faith,
reasonable belief exception to the exclusionary rule. The cases are
of a civil nature and generally involve relatively insignificant pen-
alties.14 7 Thus, the rules of evidence can be a little more flexible
than in criminal cases carrying more severe penalties. Further-
more, the privacy rights involved are those of an artificially-created
entity and not an individual person. Certainly the expectations of
privacy are vastly different as between the individual, for whose
protection the exclusionary rule was developed, and a business en-
terprise which exists solely for financial profit.
The controversy over the exclusionary rule, and the proposed ex-
ception to it, could be ended sometime in 1984, as the Supreme
Court has decided to review three criminal cases involving evi-
dence excluded under the rule. 48 If the Court applies a good faith,
reasonable belief exception to the exclusionary rule in criminal
cases, it will certainly be applicable to OSHA cases where the con-
sequences of the unconstitutional search are much less severe.
145. Rockford Drop Forge Co. v. Donovan, 672 F.2d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 1982). See also
Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co. 695 F.2d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 1982).
146. The statute was enacted to provide "safe and healthful working conditions and to
preserve our human resources." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
147. The statute provides for abatement orders requiring the employer to undertake
remedial repairs to eliminate the unsafe condition. 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1976). The statute also
imposes penalties for some violations. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(d), (h) (1976). OSHA further pro-
vides for subsequent citations, enhanced penalties, and imprisonment for willful, repetitive
or continuing violations. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (e)-(g) (1976).
148. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
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However, if the Court refuses to apply the exception in criminal
cases, it could still be applicable to civil cases-especially OSHA
cases where the use of the exception seems particularly
appropriate.
David Henry

